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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JERRY R. PROBST I 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, J. BRENT WOOD 
d/b/a KITCO, INC. AND STATE 
FARM FIRE & CASUALTY, 
Defendants. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for review of a decision of the 
Industrial Commission of Utah, and is brought pursuant 
to Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-83 (1953, as amended). 
The appellant claims that the Industrial Commission erred 
in reducing the award previously entered by the Administrative 
Law Judge. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On April 5, 1977, the Industrial Commission of Utah 
acting through its Administrative Law Judge, Keith E. Sohm, 
issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Award in 
this matter, which awarded the plaintiff a sum total of 
$17,708.00 plus medical expenses as compensation for the 
loss of his left hand, which was crushed and subsequently 
amputated. These injuries were found to have occurred in 
the course of his employment by the defendants. On June 24, 
1977, the Commission, pursuant to a Motion to Review filed 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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by the defendants, entered a Modification of A 
. ward' reduc. 
the award to $11,198.58, plus medical expenses. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant seeks to have the decisi'on Of the 
Industrial Commission reversed and to have the original 2. 
reinstated. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On January 24, 19 76, the plaintiff-appellant, 
Jerry Probst, was severely injured when his left hand was 
crushed in a hydraulic press while working for the defend;· 
As a result of the accident, the appellant's hand had to 
be amputated _and he is now required to wear a prosthetic 
device. At the time of the injury, the appellant ~sa 
full-time student at Brigham Young University and was 
twenty-one years old. He worked for the defendants on a 
part-time basis at night and on the weekends and was bein: 
paid $2. 50 per hour, which amount would have been increase. 
to $3.00 or $3.25 per hour after the initial trainingper: 
probably thirty days. The injury occurred after the appel:. 
had worked for the defendants for only four days. (R.14h 
Following the injury, the appellant has worked a'. 
other unskilled occupations which have paid him $500.00 p: 
month and $6. 00 per hour as compensation and has continue: 
his cbllege education. (R.53, 68-69) 
The Administrative Law Judge found that the facts 
. " d . tly in point 
as proven constitute "a classic case irec 
(3) Utah 
with the intent of Sections 35-1-76 and 35-1-75 ' 
Code Annotated (1953, as amended) 
-2-
to those 
and, pursuant 
-
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statutes, specifically found that the appellant: 
was of such age and experience when injured that 
under natural conditions his wages would be increased 
to the extent that he is entitled to the maximum 
allowable weekly wage in effect at the time of his 
injury. The severity of the injury both as to 
appearance and to inconvenience for life and 
further considering the cost of replacing and 
maintaining the artificial arm appliance further 
convinces the Law Judge that the claimant is entitled 
to the maximum average weekly wage for computation of 
permanent partial disability which means he is 
entitled tocompensationat the wage of $103.33 per 
week for 168 weeks for a total of $17,359.44. (R.144) 
The Administrative Law Judge denied the appellant's 
claim for a 15% increase based on the defendant's negligence 
in maintaining on unsafe working place. 
On the 24th of June, 1977 the Industrial Commission 
modified the appellant's award and reduced the amounts 
previously decreed. This modification was based on the 
conclusions that the legislature has intended a narrow 
application of Section 35-1-76, Utah Code Annotated, and 
that "the wage of the claimant should be determined on the 
wage within the same employment." (R.176-180) 
ARGUMENT ON APPEAL 
The appellant's contention is that the Industrial 
Commission acted arbitrarily and contrary to well-established 
Utah law when it modified the appellant's award and gave 
a narrow construction to the interpretation of Utah Code 
Annotated, § 35-1-76 (1933, as amended). 
-3-
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POINT I 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ACTED IN AN ARBITn' 
'"'RY A:: 
CAPRICIOUS MANNER AND MISAPPLIED THE PROVISIONS OF UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED, § 35-1-76 (1953, AS AMENDED) WHEN IT 
REDUCED THE APPELL.l'.\.NT' S AWARD FOR THE LOSS OF HI~ HAND. 
The appellant's main contention on 1 appea concerns 
Section 35-1-76 of the Utah Code, which reads as follows: 
If it is established that the injured employee was f 
such age and experience when injured that under 0 
natural conditions his wages would be expected to 
increase, that fact may be considered in arriving 
at his average weekly wage. 
This humanitarian statute was found to be applicable to 
this case by each of the preceding tribunals, and this 
Court is asked to interpret the statute for the first tim2 
-
in more than forty years. It is the appellant's belief tho 
the humanistic intentions of this law have been violated 
by the "narrow" construction given by the Industrial Cammi;, 
By its very language, it is clear that this statute 
was intended to provide relief under certain circumstances 
to those who are injured at an immature age and who have 
not had adequate training. The appellant respectfully 
asserts that the Administrative Law Judge properly set 
the average weekly wage at $103.33 per week. This conclus: 
gave proper consideration to the facts that the plaintiff 
h d training or skills, was a person of immature years, a no 
. d . tended to 
was employed on a temporary basis only, an in 
· capacity. 
graduate from college and increase his earning 
h appellant had earr., Judge Sohm also properly found that t e 
auent to 
far in excess of the maximum amount allowed (subse. 
-4-
I 
_......,,, 
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the injury) without any additional training or experience. 
All of these factors were considered {and properly so) 
in setting the rate of compensation. The Judge heard all 
of the evidence first-hand and was able to consider all 
of the factors. 
In reversing the Administrative Law Judge's decision, 
the Industrial Commission gave the following as its basis 
for modification: 
The applicant was working part-time at the time 
of the mishap. Prior to 1971, Section 35-1-75 {f), 
U.C.A. contained the following provision: 
If the wage is on a part-time basis, and the 
employment is regular, extend the wage to full-time 
basis, or use the wage the injured would earn if 
working full-time in such employment and determine 
as above in {a) . 
The above provision extended part-time employment 
to full-time for calculation purposes. The extension 
of full-time employment is what the applicant now 
urges we should do. Prior to 1971, any part-time 
employment, as long as the employee was regular and 
regardless of age and experience, the wage would 
be extended to full-time. The elimination by the 
legislature of sub-section {f) would indicate an 
intent to prohibit the extension of all part-time 
employees to full-time basis. If this was the 
intent, then the application of Section 35-1-76 would 
be narrowed if not eliminated. The legislature did 
not eliminate Section 35-1-76; therefore, we must 
assume the intent was to narrow its application. 
Even prior to 1971, the Supreme Court in our 
opinion cited the narrower application of Section 
35-1-76 in the case of Brewer v. Industrial Commission, 
89 Utah 596 58 P.2d 33 when they stated: 
The provision is peculiarly adapted to 
apply in case of minors or persons of immature 
years whose wages are usually less than that of 
adults in like employment, but who could be 
expected naturally and normally to reach the 
wage scale of adults with increasing years and 
experience. Where such persons are killed or 
injured, they would be placed on a compara~l~ 
basis with adults, particularly where the inJ~ry. 
is such as will reach into a period beyond maJority. 
-5-
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We conclude the applicant in this case 
of immature years who could be expected to 
higher wage scale and that his injury will 
into a period long beyond his current age. 
was one 
reach a 
reach 
Having so concluded what consideration should 
be used in extending his current wage of $2.SO 
hour. We believe the Court in the Brewer case ~er 
also set the bounds for consideration. The Utah as 
Court cited with approval the case of Industrial 
Corrunission v. Olive V. Royer 122 Ohio St 271, 17l 
N. E. 337 quoting the following language: 
Those terms (age and experience) should not 
be held to apply to all ambitious persons on the 
sole ground they aspire to promotion in more 
important, more skillful and more remunerative 
employment. 
We conclude that the wage of claimant should be 
determined on the wage within the same employment. 
Otherwise, in nearly all cases, it could be shown the 
injured employee had hopes of future changes in emplo1· 
ment leading to conclusions based on speculation. 
Claimant in this case has shown his ability to earn 
a higher wage, as he is currently earning $6.00 per 
hour. However, we do not believe this fact shoold~ 
considered in determining the permanent partial 
disability. In this regard, we believe the 
Administrative Law Judge was in error. (R.177-178) 
These conclusions are in direct contradiction to 
previous decisions of this Court and the law as establish' 
in several other states. 
The Corrunission' s ci ta ti on of the dictum from the 1 
Brewer and Royer decisions (supra) is clearly inappropriat 
because those were cases in which it was found that the 
statute in question did not apply. It is most contradicto 
because the Commission also specifically found that 
Section 35-1-76 did apply to the facts of this case. 
d in 
Therefore, the rationale is clearly inconsistent an ' 
h d by t he comroissioc fact, undermines the conclusions reac e 
On the repeal The Commission's conclusions based 
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of section 35-J-75 (f) of the Code are also clearly erroneous. 
As late as last year, this Court has repeatedly stated 
that all doubts respecting the right of compensation are 
to be resolved in favor of the claimant. McPhie v. Industrial 
commission, 567 P.2d 153 (1977). This confirms the holdings 
of many previous cases that the Workmen's Compensation Act 
is to be liberally construed in favor of recovery. 
No state has been more humane or consistent in 
its application of these principles than has the State of 
Utah. In Barber Asphalt Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 
103 Utah 371, 13S P.2d 266 (1943), this Court stated: 
workmen's compensation acts are intended: 
"to substitute a more humanitarian and economical 
system of compensation for injured workmen or their 
dependents in case of death which the more humane 
and moral conception of our time requires," and 
that such acts are "intended to afford injured 
industrial workmen or their dependents simple, 
adequate, and speedy means of securing compen-
sation, to the end that the 'cost of human wreckage 
may be taxed against the industry which employs 
it' and that society be relieved of the support 
of unfortunate victims of industrial accidents." 
It is further stated that "If there is any doubt 
'respecting the right to compensation, such doubt 
should be resolved in favor of the employee or of 
his dependents as the case may be,'" citing 
Chandler v. Industrial Comm., 55 Utah 213, 184 
P.1020, 8 A.L.R. 930. 
"The Industrial Act, including the proqedure 
therein provided, must be liberally construed, and 
with the purpose of effectuating its beneficent 
and humane objects." North Beck Mining Co. v. 
Industrial Comm., 58 Utah 486, 200 P.111, 112. 
These precepts of humanitarianism and beneficence have been 
strongly established in other cases. 
In Spencer v. Industrial Commission, 4 U.2d 185, 
290 P.2d 692 (1955) the Court stated: 
-7-
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• 
The concept upon which the Industrial c 
Act is based represents a departure from thompensatior 
f . e rules o common law in regard to compensation for · · . 
suffered in employment. Underlying the Act 7nJunes 
. d h · · lS the 1 ea t at industry should bear its fair share f 
burdens it creates through injuries to those oh the 
· • W 0 Se[" in it, regardless of who was at fault in causi ·' 
them. Its objective is to alleviate hardshipsng 
k . upon wor ers and their dependents due to industrial 
injuries, and it has been wisely observed that tl 
Act should be liberally construed to accomplish i~s 
purposes. 290 P.2d at 693-694. 
In speaking of the Act, Chief Justice Larson gave 
the following rationale in Ortega v. Salt Lake Wet Wash 
Laundry, 108 Utah 1, 156 P.2d 885 (1945): 
It is a beneficent act, passed to protect emoloye' 
and those dependent upon them, and to tax the costs 
of human wreckage against the industry which employs 
it, such burden being added to the price of the 
produce and thereby spread over the general consuming 
users of the product of the industry. Park Utah 
Mines v. Ind. Comm., supra. The general rules of 
liberal statutory construction govern the act, keepiEc 
in mind the purpose of its adoption. Industrial 
Comm. v. Daly Min. Co., 51 Utah 602, 172 P.301. 
It is to be liberally construed in favor of the injuri. 
workman. Ogden City v. Ind. Comm., 57 Utah 221, 
193 P. 857; Chandler v. Ind. Comm., 55 Utah 213, 
184 P. 1020, 8 A.L.R. 930. These are all different 
ways of saying that the purpose of the act is to view 
the workman as a part of the industrial setup and 
impose upon the industry the costs and burdens of the 
breakage, wreckage or destruction of the human p~rt .. 
of the industrial machinery, the same as of the inan1 'I 
and mechanical parts thereof. 132 P.2d at 379. 
the breakage and dest'.. I This case is a striking example of 
of the human part of the machinery. 
. d. 1 t th i· s sue of interpretatic In speaking irect y o e 
of the Act, this Court stated in Ogden Iron Works.-".'_:. 
Industrial Commission, 102 Utah 492, 132 P.2d 376 (19421 
that: 
. d . th a view to Legislation such as this Act, ma e wi d 
further social interests, must be interprete 
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not only from the juridical, but also the social 
point of view, and so as to give material justice 
its due, while formal jurisprudence has to stand 
back. There should be no anxious clinging to a 
dead letter; the interpretation should be liberal 
and in keeping with the spirit of the legislation. 
This view has been repeated emphasized in other decisions 
such as Salt Lake City v. Industrial Commission, 104 Utah 
436, 140 P.2d 644 (1943); M & K Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 
112 Utah 488, 189 P.2d 132 (1948); Looser v. Industrial 
commission, 9 U.2d 81, 337 P.2d 965 (1959); and Askren 
v. Industrial Commission, 15 U.2d 275, 391 P.2d 302 (1964). 
In Jories v. California Packing Corp., 121 Utah 612, 244 
P.2d 640 (1952), this ourt stated that if there is any 
doubt, it should always be resolved in favor of the employee. 
In light of these many holdings the decision of the 
Industrial Commission is practically inexplicable. To 
specifically give a "narrow" application to the statute is 
directly contrary to the decisions of this Court. The 
ruling of the Commission is even more difficult to understand 
in light of the nature of Section 35-1-76. This statute was 
clearly intended to help young people, particularly those 
who are as seriously injured as the appellant, and the action 
of the Commission would serve to effectively destroy its 
humanitarian intent. Such an effect is clearly contrary to 
legislative and judicial intent. 
It would appear that the Commission gave some weight 
to the experience factor but made no allowance whatsoever 
for the age factor provision of Section 35-1-76. Despite 
the explicit finding that the claimant was a person of 
-9-
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immature years, the Commission reduced the award to the 
hourly wage he would have received in less th 
an one month 
on the same job and in the same employment. Th' 
- is is clear 
contrary to its own findings and good conscience, as well 
as the laws of this State. 
Al though there are no Utah cases which interpret 
the statute in question under analogous circumstances, ths: 
are two excellent Oklahoma cases which are almost identica: 
and which reach what the claimant considers to be a just 
result. These cases are helpful because the fact situatio· 
are very similar to this case and the Oklahoma statute is 
almost identical to Section 35-1-76. 
In Harmon's Texaco Service Station v. Kessinger,;: 
P. 2d 131 (Okla 1961) , the Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed 
a decision to increase the benefits paid to a minor on the 
grounds that his wages were likely to increase. In so doi: 
the Court stated that: "Obviously, this provision was 
for the benefit of a minor. It should be liberally constr 
in favor of the minor." 
Subsequent to the Kessinger decision, the Oklahom; 
Supreme Court has re-affirmed its position in ~ 
Grimm, 425 P.2d 992 (Okla. 1967). In that case, as in 
this one, the permanent partial disability benefits were 
set at the maximum statutory amount. This again was basd 
f 1 that l. t should be liber, on the statute and the rule o aw 
construed in favor of the minor. 
Several New York cases also support 
the Administr:: 
Law Judge's award. 
-10-
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In Donnelly v. Buffalo Evening News, Inc., 1974 
N.Y.S.2d 361 (1958), the New York Supreme Court considered 
the case of a minor newsboy who sustained a permanent, work-
related injury. The New York law, which is similar to 
§ 35-1-76, applies only to minors. 
In the Donnelly case, the appellate court upheld 
a decision which increased the claimant's award approximately 
600%. This case, which will be more completely analyzed 
under Point II, set forth the rationale for increases of 
wages in cases where the employee is immature and working 
at a temporary, low-paying job. 
The reasoning and holding of the Donnelly decision 
was reaffirmed in the case of Haldane v. Buffalo Evening 
News, 174 N.Y.S.2d 365 (1958), in which the average weekly 
wage was increased by more than 900% by employing the 
sta~utory equivalent to U.C.A. § 35-1-76. These figures 
compare to an increase of only 19% in the present case ($3.25 
as opposed to $3.87, which is the base rate for the state 
maximum figure of $103.33 per week). If an increase of 
600% to 900% can be justified by consideration of the age 
and experience of an employee, it should not be offensive 
to grant an increase of 19% in light of the facts in this 
case. As previously stated, if ~ 35-1-76 does not apply 
in this action, it is unlikely that it can be applied 
under any circumstances. The use of the section in this 
case was clearly intended by the legislature and was not 
an abuse of discretion. 
These cases stand in direct opposition to the 
-11-
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holdings in the Brewer and Royer decisions cited 
by the 
Industrial Commission. It is curious that these 
cases 
should be cited to discover the guidelines to implement a 
decision that was directly contrary to findings. 
It is 
the appellant's contention that the rationale oft~ N~ 
York cases should have been applied to reach the proper 
conclusions. 
In modifying the Law Judge's award, the Industria; 
Commission clearly violated the spirit of Section 35-1-Jo 
and many prior rulings of this Court. Their decision 
should be rescinded and the original award reinstated. 
POINT II 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ACTED ARBITRARILY AND 
UNREASONABLY WHEN IT LIMITED APPELLANT'S COMPENSATIO':I TO 
THE SAME EMPLOYMENT. 
The appellant also contends that the Industrial 
Commission erred when it concluded that: 
• . • the wage of claimant should be deter;nined . 
on the wage within the same employment. Otherwise 
in nearly all cases, it could be shown the 
injured employee had hopes of future changes 
in employment leading to conclusions based on 
speculation. (R.178) 
Such a conclusion amounts to no more than an assertion by 
the Commission that they will not abide by the spirit and 
intent of Section 35-1-76. To limit the claimant's recovc: 
receivr for the loss of his hand to that wage which he was 
in a part-time job working his way through college is 
·th gard to contrary to the well-established rules wi re 
This 1' interpretation of the Workmen's Compensation Act. 
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supported by the rationale in the New York cases previously 
cited. 
The Donnelly case thoughtfully analyzed the rule that 
the increase should be limited to the same employment and 
recognized the harshness of that rule in certain jobs and 
situations: 
The rule that a finding of wage expectancy must be 
limited to the same or a similar employment should 
have no application to the peculiar and unusual status 
of a newsboy. The statute does not require it, and 
no judicial decision has gone that far. In the Rose 
case, supra, we said: "We do not reach the question 
whether the rule is so inflexible as not to yield 
to peculiar or unusual circumstances when the salutary 
purpose of subdivision 5 might otherwise be 
thwarted, * * *." We now say that the rule is not so 
"inflexible" that it must be applied to the peculiar 
status of a newsboy and thus deprive him of fair 
and adequate compensation for an injury simply 
because he was injured in a temporary and part-time 
employment. (Emphasis added) 174 N.Y.S.2d at 363-364. 
The Court then went on to explain the reasoning 
underlying the distinctions: 
It appears without dispute that newsboys are hired 
only between the ages of twelve and eighteen, and they 
must relinquish the employment upon attaining the age 
of eighteen. It is a matter of common knowledge that 
it is a temporary, part-time employment, and never 
intended by the employer or the employee to be 
permanent. It is also a matter of common knowledge 
that the vast majority of newsboys enter other walks 
of life upon attaining majority, and that most of 
them attain substantial success. The rule in question 
undoubtedly emanated from the fact that most minor 
employees enter a field of employment in which they 
expect to continue and in which they would normally 
be advanced and receive increased earnings. In 
such cases it would be unfair to base a wage expec-
tancy upon some other and more lucrative type of 
employment. However, a newsboy never expects or 
intends to continue in the same employment, and it 
would be equally unfair to confine his wage expectancy 
to employment as a newsboy or even in the newspaper 
business. 
This claimant has a permant disability, sustained 
in his employment, which he will carry with him through 
-13-
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life and will be as much present and as m 1 . . uc 1 of a handicap after he attains majority as it · 
h la . . is now. He s ou not be limited to compensation based u 
0 a paltry $9.29 a week, earned as a part-time Pn 
b f l h · h newsbo" ecause o a ru e w ic was never intended to a " 
such an unusual and peculiar class of employ ~~~ 
(Emphasis added) 174 N.Y.S.2d at 374. ees. 
The underlined portions demonstrate th 
e striking 
similarities between a youthful newsboy and a part-time 
college employee: (1) both employments were temporary a;: 
part-time, (2) the employment was never intended to be 
permanent, (3) a vast majority of the class in question 
enter .other fields and attain substantial success (this 
is even more true with regard to college students) as 
opposed to those who enter a field of employment in which 
they expect to continue (apprentices), and (4) the rule 
was not intended to apply under the above circumstances. 
The clarity and persuasiveness of this reasoning, together 
with the basic unfairness of the situation, clearly point 
to the decision reached by Administrative Law Judge as or:, 
that is equitable and just under the circumstances. 
This line of reasoning was re-affirmed in the lat: 
Haldane decision, supra, and the appellant believes that 
it should be applied in this case for the reason that the 
situations are practically identical. 
It would certainly be contrary to the spirit 01 
., 
the statute in question and the cases cited in Point 1 i. 
for the loss Of hi. s hand were predica: a young man's award 
. temporary 
on the wages he was receiving in a part-time, · 
job that was only intended to last a very short time. 
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POINT III 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ACTED IN AN ARBITRARY 
AND UNREl\SONABLE MANNER WHEN IT REFUSED TO HEAR EVIDENCE 
AS TO THE WAGES IN THE SAME EMPLOYMENT IN WHICH THE 
APPELLANT WAS ENGAGED. 
In his Motion for Review of Modification of Award, 
the claimant asked the Industrial Commission for permission 
to present additional evidence on what constituted the 
~verage weekly wage within the same employment. (R.186). 
The Commission had previously found that this was the basis 
upon which the average weekly wage rate was to be computed. 
(R.178). In ascertaining the wage rate to be used in 
computing the claimant's benefits, the Commission used the 
figure of $3.25 per hour. It is the appellant's contention 
that this figure is totally arbitrary. It represents the 
rate to which the appellant would have been raised in a 
very short time at the same job, but it certainly has very 
little to do with the wages in that type of employment. 
This very issue was confronted in the Williamson 
case, supra, and the Oklahoma Supreme Court made the 
following finding: 
The prevailing rate scale in the industry in which 
the injury was sustained, in the geographical area 
in which it was sustained, while persuasive, is 
not controlling, as it is reasonably to be supposed 
that a minor will change his employment at a later 
date. 425 P.2d at 994. 
On that same page, the Court said: 
In Harmon's Texaco Service Station v. Kessinger, 
Okl., 365 P.2d 131, we held this statute should be 
liberally construed in favor of the minor. The 
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court in the Harm?n's Texaco case cites with 
approval the earlier case of Snoernake st t· a ion v 
Stephens, Okl., 277 P.2d 998. The Shoemak · 
· · e case is in turn based on the New York Ap-pellat D' .. 
d · · · e i v1s1on ecision in Szmuda v. Percy Kent Bag co 214 
. 3 2 . ' App Div. 41, 12 N.Y.S. 139, which holds that th · 
wages received by the minor in the particul e 
t d . ar ernploi·-men oes not necessarily control, and Point 
t b b · l · h · - s out the s rang pro a i i ty t at a minor worker will h 
his employment. c ange 
It is the appellant's belief that, taking into considerat, 
all of the factors and the intent of the law, this is a 
much better-reasoned result and urges the Court to consids: 
it in interpretting Section 35-1-76. In any event, the 
plaintiff should certainly be allowed the opportunity of 
presenting evidence as to the average wages in the same 
type of work. 
CONCLUSION 
In enacting § 35-1-76, the Utah State Legislature 
has clearly provided that, in circumstances similar to 
those in the present case, the Industrial Commission may, 
and indeed should, increase the injured employee's award 
in light of his age and experience. This case is a class'.c 
example of the circumstances anticipated by that section. 
Jerry Probst was a college student training for a professic 
degree. h · t t · means to a mud T e JOb was a temporary, par - ime 
better paying job. He never intended to do that work on 
a permanent basis and certainly did not anticipate the 
horrible injury which occurred. The evidence clearlY 
showed that he is capable of and, indeed, already has 
a under ' 
earned wages far beyond the maximum amount allowe 
. purpo:, 
for compensation : the Workmen's Compensation statutes 
f hi. s age and experience ( To increase the award in light o 
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-dict:itced by the facts in the case and was not an abuse of 
discretion by the Administrative Law Judge. In modifying 
that award, the Industrial Commission acted in an arbitrary 
and capricious fashion and contrary to the established law 
of the State of Utah. For these reasons, the Commission's 
holding should be reversed and the previous award reinstated. 
If the Court should find that the acts of the 
commission were not arbitrary, the appellant believes that 
the matter should be remanded to receive evidence of the 
appellant's earning capacity, either within or out of the 
same type of employment, there being no valid evidence 
upon which the Commission could reasonably have reached the 
conclusion it did. 
DATED at Orem, Utah, this 17th day of March, 1978. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RY E D. McEUEN 
At orney for Plaintiff-
Appellant 
56 North State Street 
Orem, Utah 84601 
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing Brief to 
Frank G. Noel, Strong & Hanni, Attorneys at Law, Suite 604 
Boston Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this 17th 
day of March, 1978. 
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